Land Ethic 4: Intrinsic Value Arguments


Next we come to the topic of intrinsic value. It is here that the Land Ethic truly makes its case. Intrinsic value arguments are made under many different names and assumptions, from the deterministic ‘biophilia’ of E.O. Wilson, to Naess’s ‘Deep Ecology’, and to Callicott and Gorke’s ‘Holism’. The common ground they share is the belief that humankind is a small part of a larger world, a dispensable part, and that life would go on fine without humans around. The first of eight points to the deep ecology platform is that, “the flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has intrinsic value. The value of non-human life forms is independent of the usefulness these may have for narrow human purposes.” Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, Cambridge, 1989, CUP, p.29 In developing the idea of a land ethic Leopold had much more than the economic value of nature to humans in mind. He used instrumental arguments since they are generally common ground for all people. He used economic rationale to support the stances he took, but more often than not he writes of the sacrifices required to have a true land ethic, and the main thrust of his essays are for the development of a relationship with the land, a valuing of it for what it is, not simply for what it can provide. He writes that, “It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value. By value I of course mean something far broader than mere economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense.” ( Leopold,223) “We can be ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in.” (Leopold, 214) Clearly Leopold thought that the land ethic must grow out of a ‘love’ for the natural world.
Wondering about the inspiration for this article? Look up the New Church, which is based on the theological writings of Emanuel Swedenborg.